

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH

XMT AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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E.O11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PORC, XF, PN, RQ, KN, KS

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS/DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR REPORT NO. 512, "NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING: STEP TOWARD COLOMBO," DATED JULY 9, 1976. HARD COPIES FOLLOW BY POUCH.

2. THREE DOCUMENTS EMERGED FROM THE RECENT MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING COMMITTEE (NACC) IN ALGIERS: A COMMUNIQUE, A DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION, AND A DRAFT ECONOMIC DECLARATION. THE DRAFT DECLARATIONS WILL CONSTITUTE THE BASIC AGENDA FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE COLOMBO SUMMIT NEXT MONTH. ANALYSIS OF THESE DOCUMENTS INDICATES THAT THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING, FROM THE US VIEWPOINT, WERE MIXED, BUT THAT THE US FARED PERHAPS SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.

3. THERE WAS A REDUCTION OF EXTREMIST RHETORIC COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS NON-ALIGNED STATEMENTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS REJECTED A SYRIAN PROPOSAL THAT THE NACC COMMUNIQUE CALL FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN, AS WELL AS THE CUBAN ATTEMPT TO INSERT LANGUAGE URGING ACTION ON PUERTO RICO BY THE UN'S COMMITTEE OF 24; THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS OUTLINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION WERE ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, HOWEVER, FROM THE NEGATIVE STANDS TAKEN AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THE NON-ALIGNED ON THREE OF THE FOUR ISSUES OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE US: THE MIDDLE EAST, PANAMA, AND KOREA. ON PUERTO RICO, THE LANGUAGE WAS CONSIDERABLY TONED DOWN.

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4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NACC MEETING LAY AS MUCH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTICIPANTS AS IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT, THE MEETING:

(A)--REVEALED THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE SRI LANKANS AS POTENTIAL LEADERS, THUS THROWING

FURTHER DOUBT ON THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE  
SIGNIFICANTLY EVENTS AT COLOMBO;

(B)--SHOWED THAT THE ALGERIANS, DESPITE THEIR RELATIVELY  
LOW PROFILE, RETAINED THE ABILITY TO DOMINATE A NON-  
ALIGNED SESSION AND THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN AN IMPOR-  
TANT FORCE WITHIN THE MILITANT CAMP;

(C)--ILLUSTRATED THAT THE MODERATES, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS,  
CONTINUED TO BE RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT THOSE US POSI-  
TIONS THAT CONFLICTED WITH MAJORITY VIEWS, THUS  
RAISING SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE MODERATES IN FILLING THE VACUUM LEFT BY ALGERIA'S  
RETIREMENT AS FORMAL LEADER OF THE NON-ALIGNED  
MOVEMENT (NAM).

5. BARRING MAJOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,  
AND DESPITE ATTEMPTS BY MILITANTS TO INFLAME THE RHETORIC  
AND RADICALIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VARIOUS ISSUES, THE  
OUTLOOK FOR THE COLOMBO SUMMIT IS THAT:

(A)--A PROPOSAL CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN  
PROBABLY WILL FAIL, ALTHOUGH THE FULL AFRICAN REACTION  
TO THE ISRAELI RESCUE OPERATION AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT IN  
UGANDA IS NOT YET CLEAR;

(B)--THE UNGA RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM-AS-RACISM WILL BE  
ENDORSED;

(C)--NORTH KOREA'S POSITION WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE FULL  
NAM SUPPORT;

(D)--THE PRESENT RELATIVELY MILD LANGUAGE ON PUERTO RICO  
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WILL REMAIN UNLESS STRENUOUS CUBAN EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN  
IT BY INCLUDING REFERENCES TO A PUERTO RICAN LIBERATION  
MOVEMENT OR TO THE COMMITTEE OF 24 SUCCEED;

(E)--A NON-INFLAMMATORY ENDORSEMENT OF PANAMA'S POSITION  
ON THE CANAL ISSUE WILL BE APPROVED UNLESS EVENTS  
IN THE US-PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS OR THE US ELECTION  
CAMPAIGN LEAD PANAMA TO CHANGE ITS MIND. END SUMMARY.

6. BEGIN TEXT: IN PREPARATION FOR THE FIFTH SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED STATES, TO BE HELD IN COLOMBO,  
SRI LANKA, AUGUST 16-19, THE 17-MEMBER NON-ALIGNED COOR-  
DINATING COMMITTEE (NACC) CONVENED ITS FOURTH MINISTERIAL  
MEETING, MAY 30-JUNE 2, IN ALGIERS. MEMBERS OF THE NACC  
ARE: ALGERIA, CUBA, GUYANA, INDIA, KUWAIT, LIBERIA,

MALAYSIA, MALI, NEPAL, PERU, SENEGAL, SOMALIA, SRI LANKA, SYRIA, TANZANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND ZAIRE.

7. THE SESSION OPENED WITH RELATIVELY MODERATE STATEMENTS BY THE CHAIRMAN, ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA; THE LIBERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO SPOKE FOR THE AFRICANS; THE INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY SPEAKING FOR THE ASIANS; AND THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEANS. THE REGIONAL SPOKESMAN FOR THE LATIN AMERICANS--GUYANESE FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS--ATTACKED THE "NORTH AMERICAN POWER'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE GUYANA, JAMAICA, AND BARBADOS"; BUT ALTHOUGH HIS REFERENCE TO DESTABILIZATION WAS INCORPORATED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE, HIS ALLUSION TO THE UNITED STATES WAS OMITTED.

8. TWENTY-NINE OTHER COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS ATTENDED THE SESSION AS OBSERVERS: AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, ARGENTINA, BANGLADESH, BURUNDI, CYPRUS, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, GUINEA, INDONESIA, IRAQ, JAMAICA, KAMPUCHEA (CAMBODIA), KOREA (DPRK), LIBYA, MADAGASCAR, MEXICO, NIGER, NIGERIA, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, PANAMA, SOCIALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO, VIETNAM, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN, YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, SUDAN, TUNISIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE (ANC).

9. THE COMMUNIQUE AND THE DECLARATIONS  
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10. THREE DOCUMENTS EMERGED FROM THE MEETING: A COMMUNIQUE, A DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION, AND A DRAFT ECONOMIC DECLARATION.

11. THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE COMMUNIQUE WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON ALGERIAN DRAFTS (THE ECONOMIC PARAGRAPHS WERE ALGERIAN AND SRI LANKAN). THE COMMUNIQUE REPRESENTED THE CONSENSUS OF THE NACC FOREIGN MINISTERS AND ESSENTIALLY REITERATED POSITIONS ADOPTED AT THE SEPTEMBER 1975 LIMA CONFERENCE, AS INTERPRETED BY ALGERIA. IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO STAND AS A SEPARATE AND FINAL DOCUMENT AND THUS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE COLOMBO SUMMIT. A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AT ALGIERS WAS DEVOTED TO ITS PREPARATION; ONE PARTICIPANT CHARACTERIZED IT AS BOUTEFLIKA'S "SWAN SONG." IT DOES NOT REPRESENT, HOWEVER, THE VIEWS OF THE NAM AS A WHOLE; THESE VIEWS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE SUMMIT.

12. THE TWO DECLARATIONS WILL CONSTITUTE THE BASIC WORKING DOCUMENTS AT COLOMBO. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFTS, AS WELL AS PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS, ARE TO BE SUBMITTED BY NAM MEMBERS TO

THE NACC IN NEW YORK BY MID-JULY. THIS GROUP, MEETING AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING THE DRAFT DECLARATIONS FOR COLOMBO. IN COLOMBO THE DECLARATIONS WILL BE CONSIDERED FIRST IN THE NACC (AUGUST 9-11) AT THE AMBASSADORIAL OR FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AND THEN REVIEWED IN A PLENARY SESSION OF NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS (AUGUST 11-14) BEFORE BEING SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FOR FINAL APPROVAL.

13. FOR THE US, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT OF THE ALGIERS MEETING WAS THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION, ORIGINALLY PREPARED BY SRI LANKA. ON MARCH 1 THE CEYLONSE HAD INFORMED EMBASSY COLOMBO THAT THEIR DRAFT WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE NACC IN NEW YORK IN APRIL. THEY DESCRIBED THE SRI LANKAN DRAFT AS A SIMPLE AND GENERALIZED STATEMENT BUT WARNED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE EMBELLISHED AS OTHER NACC MEMBERS INCORPORATED THEIR VIEWS ON ISSUES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THEM. INDEED, THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION AS IT NOW STANDS IS FAR FROM MODERATE.

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ATE ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE US.

14. VARIOUS STATES ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE THE LANGUAGE OF SEVERAL ITEMS EVEN MORE EXTREME. SOME NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE INDIANS, FEEL THAT THE DRAFT IS TOO

ANTI-US, BUT A MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO ATTENDED THE ALGIERS MEETING BELIEVES THAT THE DRAFT IS TOO MODERATE TO SURVIVE NEGOTIATION AT COLOMBO AND THAT IT WILL BE HEAVILY AMENDED BY THE MORE RADICAL STATES. AS SUCH IT IS A LIKELY TARGET FOR CHANGE BY THE RADICAL NAM MEMBERS.

15. THE SRI LANKAN-PREPARED DRAFT ECONOMIC DECLARATION, WHICH THE NACC SENT TO ALL NON-ALIGNED STATES AFTER ONLY CURSORY CONSIDERATION BY THE ALGIERS MEETING, IS A MORE MODERATELY WORDED DOCUMENT THAN PREVIOUS NON-ALIGNED MANIFESTOS. THE DOCUMENT EMPHASIZES CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION. IT REJECTS "THE DEMAND FOR THE REDISTRIBUTION OF THE WEALTH OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES," BUT AT THE SAME TIME POINTS OUT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF RESOURCES MUST BE GEARED TO THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO) AS A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR THE LONG-TERM BENEFIT OF BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE SRI LANKANS AND OTHER MODERATES HOPE THAT THE SUMMIT WILL FOCUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT POLITICAL

PROBLEMS WILL RECEIVE EQUAL ATTENTION.

16. ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE US

17. THE ALGIERS MEETING DEALT WITH THE MATTERS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES:

18. MIDDLE EAST: AS AT THE LIMA MEETING LAST SEPTEMBER, THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE ISSUES RECEIVED THE GREATEST ATTENTION. THE SYRIANS--WITH ALGERIAN ACQUIESCENCE--INTRODUCED INTO THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE COMMUNIQUE A PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN BUT RECEIVED  
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VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT:

(A)--THE ARAB GROUP AT ALGIERS HAD PREVIOUSLY DECIDED NOT TO INSIST ON LANGUAGE DEMANDING ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN IN ORDER TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE BITTER DEBATES LAST YEAR IN THE OAU MEETING AT KAMPALA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING AT LIMA.

(B)--THE MODERATE ARABS AND AFRICANS--EGYPT, ZAIRE, SENEGAL--WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND ALGERIA ALSO PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLES IN REJECTING THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL;

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WERE INACTIVE.

(C)--THE ALGERIANS, PREVIOUSLY AMONG THE SUPPORTERS OF THE SYRIAN EFFORT, NOW OPPOSED SYRIA'S INTERVENTION IN LEBANON. AND, ACCORDING TO AN ALGERIAN OFFICIAL, ALTHOUGH ALGERIA WANTED ISRAEL OUT OF THE UN, IT WOULD MOVE ONLY WHEN THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE IRAQIS TOOK A SIMILAR STANCE.

19. WITH SYRIA VIRTUALLY ISOLATED, THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE WAS DROPPED. THE FINAL LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE, SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING AT LIMA, STATED THAT THE NACC "CONSIDERS THAT THE UN SHOULD TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS, INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED FOR BY CHAPTER VII (ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS) OF THE CHARTER, TO ENSURE RESPECT BY ISRAEL FOR THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE UN."

20. THE COMMUNIQUE, WHILE REFERRING TO RACISM, DID NOT SPECIFICALLY LABEL ZIONISM AS RACISM. IT ALSO CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; WELCOMED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PLO IN THE JANUARY 1976 SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS; EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE 30TH UNGA'S CREATION OF THE "COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE

INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE," I.E., THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE; CONDEMNED ISRAELI REPRESSION "IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE"; AND REAFFIRMED THAT THE PALESTINE QUESTION WAS THE CORE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

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21. THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION, SOMEWHAT MORE MODERATE THAN THE LIMA DECLARATION, DID NOT CALL FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN, BUT IT:

(A)--URGED THE NON-ALIGNED STATES TO CONSIDER SUITABLE MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER;

(B)--COMMENDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE BY THE 30TH UNGA AND URGED EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS;

(C)--URGED THE SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION, ACCORDING TO "AN APPROPRIATE TIME-TABLE," OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE UN ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE QUESTIONS;

(D)--RECOGNIZED THAT THE EARLY CONVENING OF A GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE, WITH PLO PARTICIPATION, WAS ESSENTIAL; AND

(E)--WELCOMED PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN JANUARY 1976.

22. THE DECLARATION ALSO STATED THAT THE NAM SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 3379 OF THE 30TH UNGA, "WHICH DETERMINED THAT ZIONISM IS A FORM OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION." THIS WAS THE FIRST EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE UNGA RESOLUTION TO APPEAR IN NON-ALIGNED DOCUMENTATION. ITS ACCEPTANCE AT COLOMBO IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

23. PUERTO RICO: THE BREVITY AND NON-VITUPERATIVE LANGUAGE OF THE POLITICAL DECLARATION, WHICH "SUPPORTS THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE AND REQUESTS THAT PROMPT MEASURES BE TAKEN TOWARDS THAT END," CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH THE INFLAMMATORY LANGUAGE OF BOTH THE 1973 ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT STATEMENT AND THE LIMA DECLARATION. THE LATTER SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR UN MEASURES TO EXPEDITE INDEPENDENCE. IT:

(A)--URGED THE UN TO RECOGNIZE THE MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL  
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LIBERATION AS "THE ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO";

(B)--REQUESTED THAT THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION (COMMITTEE OF 24) VISIT THE ISLAND; AND

(C)--DEMANDED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT CEASE "ALL POLITICAL OR REPRESSIVE MANEUVERS PERPETUATING THE COLONIAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO."

24. CUBA HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO PRESS THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO GAIN SUPPORT IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24 FOR AN INITIATIVE TO GRANT OBSERVER STATUS TO THE PUERTO RICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. NEITHER THE DECLARATION NOR THE COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO THIS MOVEMENT. THE LANGUAGE OF BOTH DOCUMENTS WAS DISTINCTLY A RETREAT FROM--BUT NOT AN ABANDONMENT OF--THE EARLIER NON-ALIGNED POSITION.

25. CUBAN PRESSURE WAS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH REAFFIRMED:

(A)--THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF 1960"; AND

(B)--THE ACTIVE SOLIDARITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT "WITH THAT PEOPLE IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO ATTAIN FULL ENJOYMENT OF THEIR NATIONAL RIGHTS."

26. ACCORDING TO A PERUVIAN DELEGATE, THE CUBANS AT ONE POINT PUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE A PHRASE URGING ACTION BY THE COMMITTEE OF 24, BUT ULTIMATELY THE PHRASE WAS ELIMINATED. PROGRESSIVE DRAFTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ILLUSTRATED THE COURSE OF CUBAN EFFORTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE REFERENCE TO "NATIONAL RIGHTS" WAS A SUBSTITUTION FOR "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS," WHICH, IN THE VIEW OF SOME DELEGATES, EFFECTIVELY DEFINED PUERTO RICO AS A NATION.

27. PANAMA: THE POLITICAL DECLARATION REITERATED "FULL SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PANAMA IN THEIR  
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EFFORT TO RECOVER THEIR SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CANAL ZONE"--A FORMULATION SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND SOMEWHAT BRIEFER AND LESS STRIDENT THAN THE LIMA DECLARATION.



28. EARLIER LANGUAGE ON THE CANAL ISSUE, CIRCULATED BEFORE MAY 3 AND ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN BY PANAMA, CONTAINED SUCH TERMINOLOGY AS "THE COLONIAL ENCLAVE"... "EXISTING IN PANAMA AGAINST THE WILL OF ITS PEOPLE." THESE PHRASES HAD ALREADY BEEN ELIMINATED FROM THE SRI LANKAN DRAFT, BUT THE FULL EXPLANATION OF WHY THEY WERE NOT REINSTATED AT THE MEETING IS NOT KNOWN.

29. THE COMMUNIQUE WAS BRIEFER AND LESS STRIDENT ON THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE THAN WAS THE LIMA DECLARATION. IT EXPRESSED "SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA IN ITS JUST STRUGGLE TO REGAIN EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE CANAL ZONE OCCUPIED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA."

30. KOREA: THE COMMUNIQUE EXPLICITLY ENDORSED THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION.

(A)--IT SUPPORTED "THE POLICY ADVOCATED BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE ITSELF IN PEACE AND IN INDEPENDENCE AND ON THE BASIS OF THE GREAT NATIONAL UNITY AND WITHOUT ANY FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AS STIPULATED IN THE NORTH-SOUTH STATEMENT OF JULY 4, 1972."

(B)--IT AFFIRMED THAT "IN ORDER TO REMOVE ALL TENSION AND DANGER OF NEW WAR IN KOREA, AND TO ACHIEVE THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION, IT IS ABOVE ALL NECESSARY TO WITHDRAW ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE UN FLAG, DISMANTLING FOREIGN MILITARY BASES, AND REPLACING THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH A PEACE TREATY."

31. THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE (WHICH IS NOT AVAILABLE) ON KOREA WAS DRAFTED BY THE ALGERIANS AND THE SRI LANKANS BUT WAS HEAVILY AMENDED BY THE NORTH KOREANS. EFFORTS TO  
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MODERATE THE LANGUAGE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE KOREAN QUESTION WAS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ISSUE FOR MOST PARTICIPANTS, WHO THEREFORE SAW NO NEED TO ARGUE OVER IT. INDEED, DEBATE ON THE ISSUE REPORTEDLY TOOK ONLY A FEW MINUTES. ONLY MALAYSIA APPARENTLY EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTIONS THAT EVENTUALLY APPEARED AS A FORMAL RESERVATION. HOWEVER, THE MALAYSIAN DEPUTY UN REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED THAT MALAYSIAN EFFORTS TO DELETE THE INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA'S POSITION WERE ABANDONED FOR FEAR OF OPENING THE WAY TO THE INCLUSION OF EVEN HARSHER

RHETORIC.

32. THE POLITICAL DECLARATION ALSO ENDORSED NORTH KOREA'S POSITION, ALTHOUGH NOT BY NAME, CALLING FOR:

(A)--WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA;

(B)--CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES;

(C)--TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC); AND

(D)--REPLACEMENT OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY A "DESIRABLE" PEACE AGREEMENT.

33. THE DECLARATION SUPPORTED "THE EFFORTS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA TO REUNIFY THEIR TERRITORIES PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF REUNIFICATION STIPULATED IN THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 4, 1972."

34. WITH A FEW RELATIVELY MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE WORDING OF THE POLITICAL DECLARATION WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT OF THE LIMA DECLARATION AND THE DRAFT TEXT THAT THE NORTH KOREANS CIRCULATED TO NACC MEMBERS IN APRIL.

(A)--UNLIKE THE NACC COMMUNIQUE, THE DECLARATION DROPPED THE PHRASE "UNDER THE UN FLAG" WHEN CALLING FOR THE

REMOVAL OF ALL TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA. WHETHER OR NOT NORTH KOREA INTENDED TO ELIMINATE THIS PHRASE ENTIRELY IS NOT CLEAR.

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(B)--THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION APPARENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE A MODICUM OF BALANCE BY REFERRING TO "THE EFFORTS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA" TO REUNIFY THEIR TERRITORIES PEACEFULLY.

(C)--SOME OF THE LANGUAGE WAS SOFTENED, COMPARED WITH LIMA (E.G., "CALLING FOR" WITHDRAWAL INSTEAD OF "DEMANDING").

(D)--REFERENCES TO THE CLOSURE OF MILITARY BASES AND TERMINATION OF THE UNC APPEARED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A NON-ALIGNED DOCUMENT.

35; PYONGYANG REPORTEDLY WAS SO UNHAPPY WITH THE COMMUNIQUE'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE HARSHLY CONDEMNING SOUTH KOREA (AND BY IMPLICATION THE US) THAT IT SENT NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATS TO THE UN MISSIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA, CUBA,

ALGERIA, AND INDIA TO EXPRESS DISPLEASURE. THE NORTH KOREANS ALSO LOBBIED AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED TO CHANGE THE VENUE FOR THE SUMMIT FROM COLOMBO TO SINGAPORE; THE SOUTH KOREANS HAVE A PERMANENT MISSION IN SRI LANKA, WHILE NORTH KOREA'S ATTEMPTS TO REOPEN ITS MISSION SO FAR HAVE BEEN BLOCKED BY THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT. THE YUGOSLAVS STRONGLY REJECTED PYONGYANG'S SUGGESTION.

36. THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS

37. ALGERIA, CUBA, INDIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY ALGIERS, DOMINATED THE NACC SESSIONS. ALGERIA'S DELEGATION NUMBERED 29; YUGOSLAVIA, 16; INDIA, 15; AND CUBA, 13. THE NEAREST COMPETITOR WAS ZAIRE WITH 9.

38. ALGERIA'S BOUTEFLIKA AND HIS DELEGATION DEMONSTRATED ANEW THEIR CONSIDERABLE ABILITY TO DOMINATE A NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY ONE ON THEIR OWN TURF. THEY WERE ABLE TO INFLUENCE PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN TOUGH NEGOTIATORS AND A MAJOR FORCE IN PUSHING RADICAL VIEWS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

39. EARLIER THE ALGERIANS HAD SUCCESSFULLY PREVAILED UPON  
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THE NACC TO HOLD THIS MEETING IN ALGIERS, ELBOWING INDIA OUT OF THE WAY IN THE PROCESS. THEY HAD ALSO INSISTED

THAT THE NACC CONCENTRATE ON THE COMMUNIQUE RATHER THAN ON THE DRAFT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DECLARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT.

40. WELL PREPARED AND BUSINESSLIKE (VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS MOVED TO THE CONFERENCE SITE), THE ALGERIANS FORCED THE MINISTERS, IN CONSIDERING THE COMMUNIQUE, TO WORK FROM ALGERIAN TEXTS DRAFTED WEEKS IN ADVANCE. MOREOVER, THE ALGERIANS HAD A STOCK OF FALL-BACK POSITIONS READILY AVAILABLE.

41. NONETHELESS, AT THE NACC MEETING, THE ALGERIANS APPARENTLY LIVED UP TO THEIR EARLIER ASSERTION THAT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE, I.E., THAT THEIR ROLE AT THIS SESSION WOULD BE TO PASS ON THE BATON OF NAM LEADERSHIP TO OTHERS. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, THEY LARGELY ESCHewed NORMAL PRESSURE TACTICS AND THEIR DELEGATION DISPLAYED AN ATTITUDE OF REASONABLENESS. AS A RESULT, THERE WERE NO SUBSEQUENT ACCUSATIONS FROM OTHER PARTICIPANTS THAT THE ALGERIANS HAD BULLIED THEM OR THAT ITEMS WERE RAILROADED THROUGH. NOR DID THE ALGERIANS TAKE THE LEAD ON ISSUES OF

IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. RATHER, THE CUBANS, THE NORTH KOREANS, AND THE SYRIANS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RADICALIZING THE COMMUNIQUE.

42. A NOTABLE EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL SUCCESS OF THE ALGERIANS WAS THE FAILURE OF THEIR ATTEMPT TO TORPEDO THE SRI LANKAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DRAFTS BY REFERRING THEM TO THE NACC IN NEW YORK. THIS EFFORT WAS THWARTED BY THE YUGOSLAVS AND LIBERIANS, WHO PERSUADED THE ALGERIANS TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFTS TO THE 83 NAM MEMBERS AFTER ONLY CURSORY CONSIDERATION BY THE NACC. EVEN THOUGH THESE DOCUMENTS WOULD BE OPEN TO REVISION, THEY WOULD BE THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS AT COLOMBO.

43. SRI LANKA: DURING THE MEETING, THE SRI LANKAN DELEGATION TRIED TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE BUT LAPSED INTO SILENCE AND IMPOTENCE. AS EXPECTED, THE CEYLONESE WERE  
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INEFFECTUAL ON POLITICAL ISSUES, LACKING THE ASSERTIVENESS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY OF THE COLOMBO SUMMIT. WHATEVER HELP SRI LANKA RECEIVED AT ALGIERS APPEARS TO HAVE COME PRIMARILY FROM THE YUGOSLAVS, WHO DESCRIBED THE CEYLONESE AS "INDECISIVE AND THEIR OWN WORST ENEMY."

43. INDIA: INFORMATION ON INDIA'S PARTICIPATION IS CONTRADICTIONARY. THERE WERE INDICATIONS EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THE INDIANS INTENDED TO PLAY A MORE FORCEFUL ROLE IN THE

NACC; ACCORDING TO THE US OBSERVER, HOWEVER, THE INDIAN DELEGATION, LED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY CHAVAN, DISPLAYED NO DESIRE TO REASSERT INDIA'S FORMER LEADERSHIP IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. EMBASSY ALGIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION FROM OTHER DIPLOMATIC SOURCES THAT THE INDIANS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE: ACCORDING TO ONE DIPLOMAT, THE INDIANS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED--MOSTLY RULES REGARDING MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM AND PARTICIPATION AT COLOMBO IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP PAKISTAN OUT OF THE MOVEMENT--AND WHAT INDIA OPPOSED DID NOT COME TO PASS. (THE NACC REFERRED TO COLOMBO THE THORNY ISSUE OF APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE SUMMIT BY ROMANIA AND THE PHILIPPINES (AS OBSERVERS) AND AUSTRALIA AND PORTUGAL (AS GUESTS), AS WELL AS SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES AS ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT SECRETARIAT. THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED THAT ANGOLA, THE COMORO ISLANDS, AND THE SEYCHELLES BE ACCEPTED AS FULL MEMBERS AND THAT BELIZE, EVEN THOUGH NOT INDEPENDENT, BE CONSIDERED A SPECIAL CASE, PRESUMABLY A SPECIAL GUEST. APPROVAL BY THE SUMMIT WOULD RAISE TOTAL NAM MEMBERSHIP TO 86.) AN INDIAN OFFICIAL

INDICATED THAT THE PUERTO RICO AND PANAMA ISSUES WERE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO NEW DELHI. ACCORDING TO OTHER SOURCES, THE INDIAN DELEGATION WAS OF LITTLE HELP ON THE KOREAN ISSUE.

45. YUGOSLAVIA: THE YUGOSLAVS SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL GROUP AFTER THE ALGERIANS. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN TONING DOWN, IN COOPERATION WITH THE ALGERIANS, EXTREMIST POSITIONS OF THE CUBANS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS AND IN BLOCKING SYRIA'S MOVE ON ISRAELI  
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EXCLUSION FROM THE UN. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF COMPETITION WITH THE ALGERIANS FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE MEETING, NOR, APPARENTLY, OF YUGOSLAV RESENTMENT OF ALGERIAN CONDUCT.

46. CUBA: DESPITE THE MILITANT AND ACTIVIST ROLE OF THE CUBANS, THEY ACHIEVED ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS. CONCENTRATING ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES, THEY FOUGHT HARD FOR THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (WHICH THEY ACHIEVED); BUT THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INSERT IN THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE NATURAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND STRONG CRITICISM OF THE US FOR THE "FAILURE" OF UNCTAD IV. THE HEAVYHANDED CUBAN TACTICS IN CONNECTION WITH UNCTAD AROUSED THE IRE OF MANY DELEGATES AND WERE LARGELY REBUFFED BY SUCCESSFUL ALGERIAN-YUGOSLAV EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE REST OF THE NACC TO SOFTEN THE COMMUNIQUE'S LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT.

47. ZAIRE AND OTHER OUTSPOKEN MODERATES: ZAIRE BELONGS IN THAT CATEGORY OF STATES (INCLUDING SENEGAL AND MALAYSIA) WHOSE DELEGATIONS APPARENTLY CONTINUED TO FIGHT FOR MORE MODERATE LANGUAGE EVEN AFTER THE BATTLE WAS LOST. THE ZAIRIANS CARRIED THEIR FIGHT TO THE POINT OF EXPRESSING FORMAL RESERVATIONS TO THE COMMUNIQUE'S SECTIONS ON ANGOLA, SAHARA, GUANTANAMO, THE PANAMA CANAL, PUERTO RICO, AND CHILE (HUMAN RIGHTS). THESE RESERVATIONS, IN A MARKED DEPARTURE FOR NAM MEETINGS, WERE ENTERED IN THE RECORD, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT ACCOMPANY THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE THAT WAS MADE PUBLIC.

48. FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA LATER TOLD EMBASSY KINSHASA THAT THERE WERE PRACTICAL LIMITS TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH ZAIRE COULD CHALLENGE ITS NON-ALIGNED COLLEAGUES, BUT HE APPARENTLY TRIED HARD TO UPHOLD MODERATE POSITIONS AND MAY BE CRITICIZED BY OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES FOR HIS EFFORTS.

49. EMBASSY ALGIERS HAS REPORTED THAT DIPLOMATIC SOURCES

AGREED THAT THE SENEGALESE AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA WAS THE LEADER IN THE BATTLE AGAINST RADICAL PROPOSALS, FREQUENTLY CLASHING WITH BOUTEFLIKA, WHO REPEATEDLY TRIED TO SILENCE  
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HIM. IN ADDITION, HIS DELEGATION EXPRESSED A FORMAL RESERVATION ON THE SAHARA ITEM.

50. MALAYSIA'S EXPRESSION OF OPPOSITION TO RADICAL PROPOSALS APPARENTLY WAS RESTRICTED TO THE KOREAN ISSUE.

51. OTHERS: DELEGATIONS FROM GUYANA AND TANZANIA WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH DECOLONIZATION QUESTIONS. THE GUYANESE WERE DESCRIBED BY THE YUGOSLAVS AS FORCEFUL, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF GUYANESE FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS' OPENING DAY STATEMENT SHARPLY CRITICIZING US POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA. GUYANA HAS SINCE INDICATED THAT IT WILL PRESS THE "DESTABILIZATION" ISSUE AT COLOMBO.

52. NEPAL, KUWAIT, PERU, AND LIBERIA GENERALLY ADVOCATED MODERATION BUT APPEARED UNWILLING TO RISK EMBARRASSMENT AND ISOLATION BECAUSE OF THEIR STAND; MALI GENERALLY WENT ALONG WITH THE MAJORITY.

53. IRAQ, WHICH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS HAD GIVEN EVERY INDICATION OF SEEKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WAS QUIESCENT, PERHAPS IN THE BELIEF THAT BY PRESSING ITS MILITANT POSITIONS IT WOULD STEP ON TOO MANY TOES.

IRAQ HAD COME TO THE NACC TO PROPOSE SEVERAL PROCEDURAL CHANGES AS WELL AS TO PUSH FOR A NON-ALIGNED PERMANENT SECRETARIAT, WHICH IT HOPED WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN BAGHDAD. IT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ELICITING INTEREST IN, LET ALONE SUPPORT FOR, A PERMANENT SECRETARIAT. TOGETHER WITH OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSALS, THIS INITIATIVE WAS FORWARDED TO COLOMBO FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

54. NORTH KOREA WAS REPRESENTED BY A RATHER LARGE DELEGATION WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS ON ISSUES OTHER THAN KOREA WAS UNDERCUT BY ITS HEAVYHANDED TACTICS.

55. SYRIA PLAYED AN ACTIVIST ROLE ONLY WITH RESPECT TO MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, SPECIFICALLY THAT OF ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN. IT FAILED IN ITS LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN NACC ENDORSEMENT OF ITS INTERVENTION IN LEBANON.

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56. SOVIET AND CHINESE ACTIVITY WAS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. THE CHINESE AND SOVIETS ATTENDED THE OPENING SESSION; BOTH APPARENTLY KEPT A LOW PROFILE, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY OUT OF DEFERENCE TO THEIR SURROGATE, THE CUBANS.

57. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

58. DESPITE A REDUCTION OF EXTREMIST RHETORIC, THE SUBSTANCE OF BOTH THE NACC COMMUNIQUE AND THE DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE FOUR ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE US WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE LIMA DECLARATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE MEETING HAD BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW.

59. POSITIVE: THE HANDLING OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE ISSUES, DESPITE LANGUAGE CALLING FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, SHOWED THAT THE COMBINATION OF MODERATE ARAB (PRIMARILY EGYPTIAN) AND AFRICAN OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN--AN ALLIANCE THAT FIRST EMERGED AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN KAMPALA LAST YEAR--IS STILL INTACT. SYRIA, FORMERLY IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE MAJOR ACTORS, LOST GROUND BECAUSE ALGERIA, IRAQ, AND LIBYA OPPOSED ITS INTERVENTION IN LEBANON.

60. THE LANGUAGE DEALING WITH PUERTO RICO AND PANAMA WAS ALSO AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THAT OF OTHER RECENT NON-ALIGNED MEETINGS. FURTHERMORE, THE NACC DID NOT RECOMMEND A COURSE OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS AT COLOMBO AND AT THE UNGA THIS FALL.

61. NEGATIVE: THE NACC'S ENDORSEMENT OF NORTH KOREA'S POSITION DEMONSTRATED THE STRENGTH OF PYONGYANG'S POSITION AND THE DIFFICULTY OF TRYING TO PERSUADE INDIVIDUAL NAM MEMBERS TO TREAT THE PROBLEM MORE EVENHANDEDLY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF A NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE.

62. ALGERIA'S PERFORMANCE AT THE NACC INDICATED THAT IT REMAINS A PRINCIPAL LEADER OF THE MILITANTS WITHIN THE NAM. AS SUCH, IT WILL BE IN A STRONG POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS TO RETURN TO CONFRONTATION TACTICS.

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63. THE INABILITY OF SRI LANKA TO EXERT LEADERSHIP RAISES FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE CEYLONESE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AT COLOMBO, DESPITE THEIR CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE SESSIONS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFERENCE'S

ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY.

64. THE MODERATES--WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF ZAIRE, SENEGAL, AND MALAYSIA--DID NOT OPPOSE THE MAJORITY ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE US, DESPITE EXTENSIVE PRIOR REPRESENTATIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF A US OBSERVER. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MODERATES IN FILLING THE VACUUM LEFT BY ALGERIA'S DEPARTURE AS FORMAL LEADER OF THE NAM IS THUS IN SERIOUS DOUBT.

65. ON BALANCE, THE NACC MEETING CAME OUT ABOUT AS WELL AS--AND POSSIBLY EVEN SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN--THE US COULD HAVE EXPECTED, GIVEN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH US INFLUENCE WAS INDIRECT AT BEST. THE PROGNOSTICATION FOR COLOMBO IS FOR MORE OF THE SAME. ALTHOUGH THE MILITANTS WILL TRY TO INCREASE THE RHETORIC AND RADICALIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DRAFT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DECLARATIONS BEFORE AND AT COLOMBO, THE OUTLOOK FOR THE AUGUST SUMMIT IS THAT:

(A)--THE PROPOSAL CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM THE UN, WHICH AGAIN WILL BE RAISED BY SYRIA, PROBABLY WILL FAIL;

(B)--A DEMAND FOR MANDATORY ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER, WILL BE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF THE POLITICAL DECLARATION.

(C)--THE UNGA RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM-AS-RACISM WILL BE ENDORSED.

(D)--NORTH KOREA'S POSITION WILL BE SUPPORTED, POSSIBLY WITH THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE HARsher PHRASEOLOGY OMITTED FROM THE ALGIERS COMMUNIQUE.

(E)--THE RELATIVELY MILD LANGUAGE ON PUERTO RICO WILL  
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REMAIN, UNLESS STRENUOUS CUBAN EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN IT BY INCLUDING REFERENCES TO A PUERTO RICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OR TO THE COMMITTEE OF 24 SUCCEED.

(F)--THE NON-INFLAMMATORY NATURE OF PANAMA'S POSITION PROBABLY WILL HOLD, UNLESS EVENTS IN THE US-PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS OR THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN LEAD PANAMA TO REQUEST OTHERWISE. END OF TEXT. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED SUVA.

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